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This paper assesses the role of exchange rates in moderating the impact of economic 
disturbances in the new member states of the European Union, and finds some evidence in 
favour of this proposition. Exchange rates are mostly driven by real (demand) shocks, whilst 
output by real supply shocks. Nominal shocks, which have no long-run impact on output, are 
nevertheless important in explaining exchange rate fluctuations implying that less exchange 
rate flexibility may indeed be warranted in the run-up to the adoption of the euro. We find 
that while interest rate shocks generally do not explain exchange rate fluctuations, credit 
shocks matter in certain cases and seem to have considerable impact on exchange rate 
developments (e.g., for Poland). The analysis also shows that based on the average responses 
of exchange rates to different shocks, the adoption of narrow bands inside ERM II may be 
risky.  
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This paper assesses the role of real and nominal shocks in exchange rate fluctuations in (nine 
of) the ten new member states of the European Union. To our knowledge, this is the first 
attempt to analyze in a uniform fashion exchange rate fluctuations in the new member states. 
The methodology used allows us to differentiate between real and nominal shocks, and to 
assess their impact on real and nominal exchange rates: unlike real shocks, nominal shocks 
are assumed to have no long-run impact on real exchange rates or output (see Clarida and 
Gali, 1994). The analysis is taken one step further in order to throw some light on the precise 
source of nominal shocks with the inclusion of interest rate and credit information. This 
extension allow us to examine whether monetary policy or credit shocks are significant and 
have any bearing on exchange rate developments. 
 
The results suggest that exchange rates are mostly driven by real (demand) shocks, whilst 
output by real supply shocks. Nominal shocks are also important, however, explaining a 
significant share of the variance of the exchange rate. We therefore examine to what extent 
interest rate policy contributes in a significant way to exchange rate fluctuations, but find 
little evidence in favor of that proposition. Credit shocks seem to be important in explaining 
the variance of exchange rates (e.g., in Poland, Latvia, Slovakia and the Czech Republic), 
and in some cases the variance of output (e.g., Cyprus, Poland, and Estonia).  
 
The dominance of real shocks is noteworthy and, to the extent that it is symptomatic of 
“more to come” as real convergence advances, it could have implications for countries’ 
decision to enter ERM II and adopt the euro soon after: in the face of real shocks exchange 
rates act as shock absorbers, and hence help smooth output fluctuations. Interestingly, real 
demand shocks seem to explain a relatively small part of the variance of exchange rates in 
the case of two early ERM II participants, namely Estonia and Lithuania. Among the other 
countries Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovenia seem to be influenced significantly by 
real demand shocks, a finding which suggests that an early move to join ERM II could, 
ceteris paribus, be more problematic in the short to medium term.  
 
The importance of nominal shocks is a reminder of the risks facing these countries in the run-
up to euro adoption. Joining ERM II sooner could significantly limit policy induced shocks 
(e.g., monetary or fiscal policy) and through expectation effects, minimize speculative and 
contagion effects. The analysis does not reveal a significant impact from (relative) interest 
rates, but finds some evidence that credit developments are important in the determination of 
exchange rates. Although interest rates may converge fast, developments in credit markets 
may continue to diverge for the foreseeable future. The policy implication of the latter is two-
fold. First, policy makers should avoid resorting to controls in the banking system that could 
adversely affect exchange rate volatility. Secondly, to the extent that fiscal policy contributes 
to higher domestic demand, a tighter fiscal stance would affect the overall demand for credit 
and thereby limit the impact on exchange rate volatility.  
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
On May 1
st 2004, ten countries joined the European Union (EU), of which three—Estonia, 
Lithuania, and Slovenia—have already entered ERM II, with a view to fulfilling the 
Maastricht criteria by 2006 and adopting the euro as early as 2007. The remaining new 
member states have also indicated their intention to join ERM II soon, sparking a debate for 
the optimal timing of entry. The role of exchange rates, and of exchange rate regimes, in 
buffering exogenous shocks is key in this debate. Countries may choose early entry in ERM 
II so as to shield their economies from a variety of asymmetric shocks and speculative 
attacks, which tend be exacerbated by sizeable exchange rate movements (see Kontolemis, 
2003, for example).  Conversely, in cases where more exchange rate flexibility is deemed 
appropriate—perhaps due to more need for real convergence, or where progress in 
consolidating public finances is slower—a shorter stay inside ERM II may be the preferred 
strategy.   
 
Recent academic research has examined the degree to which exchange rates provide a 
cushion against shocks in the face of asymmetric shocks.
2 Borghijs and Kuijs (2004), 
Pelkman, Gros, and Ferrer (2000), and Gros and Thygesen (1998) have concluded that 
flexible exchange rates in transition countries are poor buffers against external shocks. Other 
studies have argued in favour of floating exchange rates particularly in the face of temporary 
shocks (Vinhas de Souza and Ledrut, 2002, for example). On the other hand, Buiter and 
Grafe (2002), Coricelli (2002), Begg, et al (2003), and Schadler, et al (2004) have stressed 
that volatile capital flows and trend real appreciation pressures can lead to currency crises, 
necessitating a shorter stay inside ERM II. 
 
A number of important questions arise concerning the role of exchange rates in moderating 
the impact of economic disturbances. Are exchange rate shock absorbers, or shock 
                                                 
2 Frenkel and Nickel (2002) and Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2002) have shown that while a degree of correlation 
between accession and euro area shocks exists, the majority of supply and demand shocks facing accession 
countries appear to be asymmetric in nature.   - 4 - 
 
propagators? Do policies, either monetary or fiscal, influence exchange rate movements and 
what role do nominal or financial shocks play in exchange rate determination? Alternatively, 
to what extent do real demand factors, stemming from trade liberalisation and market 
opening, affect exchange rates? Answers to these questions boil down to what types of 
shocks explain the variance of exchange rates, and whether these shocks affect output, and 
prices. A related, and equally important, issue is whether the proposed ERM II fluctuation 
bands are sufficiently wide to accommodate exchange rate fluctuations triggered by 
exogenous real, or nominal, shocks. 
 
Early attempts at understanding real exchange rate movements in transition countries centred 
on decomposing real exchange rate changes into those due to real (or permanent), and 
nominal (or temporary) shocks. As noted by Kutan and Dibooglu (2000), decompositions of 
this type were particularly useful in determining the effectiveness of monetary and fiscal 
policy in transition economies: a significantly large temporary component in the real 
exchange rate may indicate a high degree of nominal price inertia, suggesting that nominal 
exchange rate changes can influence the real exchange rate, and hence competitiveness. 
Kutan and Dibooglu’s results suggested that in the case of Poland, for example, where 
nominal shocks explained over ¾ of the real exchange rate's forecast error variance at short 
horizons and continued to play an important role after some three years, monetary and 
exchange rate policies could have been effectively used to manage competitiveness.
3  
 
Mundell (1964), Obstfeld (2002) and others have shown that the ability of exchange rates to 
absorb shocks depends on the type of shocks that buffet the economy. For example, real 
asymmetric shocks, which require adjustments in relative prices to avoid output losses or 
inflation, can be accomplished by flexible exchange rates even in the context of price 
rigidity. Thus an unexpected increase in demand would cause a nominal exchange rate 
                                                 
3 In sharp contrast, results from these relatively simple models estimated for industrial countries (Lastrapes, 
1992, and Enders and Lee, 1997, for example), indicated that real factors play by far the dominant role in 
determining real (and nominal) exchange rate variability, suggesting competitiveness can only be improved by 
focusing on enhancements in productivity and efficiency.   - 5 - 
 
appreciation, reducing demand pressures through normal expenditure switching channels, 
and in effect absorbing the shock. On the other hand, negative nominal shocks, such as those 
originating from a money market imbalance, would result in an interest rate spike and a 
exchange rate appreciation, which only serve to exacerbate the negative impact on output. In 
this case, flexible rates would only serve to propagate the shock.  
 
The shock absorption capacity of exchange rates, however, depends on the pricing regime 
that governs market decisions.
4 In the sticky price world described above, flexible exchange 
rates achieve desirable relative price changes—and create expenditure switching—if nominal 
prices are set in producers’ currencies. In effect, price changes are fully passed through to 
consumers and result in a minimization of the variance of output in the presence of a real 
shock. By contrast, if prices are set in local currencies and there is pricing-to-market, 
exchange rate changes have little or no effect on final consumer goods prices. In this context, 
exchange rates will not be able to act as a shock absorber when real shocks hit the economy. 
The current empirical evidence on pass through effects tends to support the view that 
exchange rate changes do move relative prices (see Obstfeld, 2002, for example).  
 
This paper attempts to address these questions for the nine new member states of the EU 
(Malta is excluded for data availability reasons). The empirical methodology employed is 
based on the structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) model pioneered by Blanchard and 
Quah (1989), and applied in an open macro framework by Clarida and Gali (1994). This 
allows for the consideration of a wider range of exogenous shocks that closely fit traditional 
IS-LM structural exchange rate models. For example, use of three endogenous variables—
relative output, real effective exchange rates, and nominal exchange rates—allows the 
identification of three exogenous structural shocks: real aggregate supply shocks which 
include labor market and productivity developments; real goods market shocks, 
                                                 
4 See Engel (2002) and Devereux and Engle (1998) for descriptions of theoretical New Open Economy 
Macroeconomics models which have examined the international pricing of goods, and the role of exchange 
rates in international adjustment. Much of this literature has focused on the welfare effects of fixed versus 
floating exchange regimes.   - 6 - 
 
encompassing exogenous changes to real relative domestic absorption; and nominal shocks, 
reflecting shifts in both relative money supplies and money demands.
5 Based on this model it 
is possible to examine the factors behind movements in real exchange rates, while an 
examination of the sources of variance of relative output can be used to answer the shock 
absorber-propagation question. The above discussion indicates that when fluctuations in 
exchange rates are mostly driven by real shocks, particularly supply shocks, the more likely 
the exchange rate will be a good absorber. By the same token, a more frequent occurrence of 
nominal shocks would imply little need for a flexible exchange rate lever. Indeed, flexible 
rates in the face a predominance of nominal asymmetric shocks would only act as propagator 
of shocks. 
 
The empirical analysis is taken one step further with an examination of the precise source of 
nominal shocks via the inclusion of relative interest rates and relative credit. To the extent 
that nominal exchange rate fluctuations are explained by changes in interest rates one should 
expect such source of divergences to gradually dissipate once countries join ERM II. 
However, credit shocks—which are uncorrelated with monetary policy shocks and are related 
to the process of real convergence—can be more problematic if these are found to influence 
exchange rates. Private sector credit has soared in the majority of these countries, and—given 
the level of income relative to the euro area—it will continue to rise, albeit at a slower pace 
in some countries where leverage ratios have increased significantly. 
 
 
II.   EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Standard open economy models recognize two distinct types of shocks, with different 
impacts on real and nominal exchange rates. Real shocks, which can come from supply or 
demand sources, can affect both real and nominal exchange rates. Nominal shocks, perhaps 
                                                 
5 Variants of this model have been empirically applied to bilateral rates in the U.S. by Clarida and Gali (1994), 
to Japan by Chadha and Prasad (1997), and to the U.K. by Astley and Garratt (2000).   - 7 - 
 
emanating from fiscal or monetary sources, for example, can only affect real variables in the 
short-run but should not have an impact on real variables in the long-run. In this regard, 
permanent innovations in supply and demand will result in permanent changes in real and 
nominal exchange rates. Thus, a permanent change in say, the money supply, can have a 
permanent effect on the nominal exchange rate, but only a temporary effect on the real rate. 
This notion is the basis of the econometric analysis in this paper; a detailed description of the 
econometric methodology used is presented in Appendix A. 
 
Innovation accounting results, particularly forecast error covariance decompositions and 
impulse response functions, are used to interpret and assess the importance of different (one 
standard deviation) shocks. Forecast error variance decompositions indicate how much of the 
(k-step-ahead) forecast error variance can be attributed to each innovation, enabling one to 
ascertain whether each innovation explains an important part of the variable in question. 
Impulse response functions map out the dynamic response of individual variables to 
particular shocks, and as noted above, are helpful in verifying the response of each variable 
to a given shock. In addition, historical decompositions compare the behavior of the actual 
endogenous series to the simulated series that are driven by the accumulated shocks which 
allows a determination of the relative importance of each of these shocks over historical 
episodes.  
 
All data series are defined relative to the euro area. Hence effective exchange rates are 
defined only vis-à-vis the euro area, and are not the conventional effective exchange rate 
series which are based on all trading partners for each country. Similarly, relative output is 
defined in a similar fashion for consistency. Appendix B presents preliminary data analysis 
and details concerning the data used for each country. In what follows, only results based on 
a common-to-all-countries sample are presented, spanning 1994 to present.
6 The models are 
specified according to the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), in first differences.  
                                                 
6 More results, including for longer sample periods, can be found at www.kontolemis.com/pages/5/index.htm.   - 8 - 
 
 
Clearly, the degree of flexibility, both in exchange rates and prices, will affect the resulting 
innovation dynamics seen in any empirical study. The empirical analysis in this paper does 
not make any specific adjustments for differences in exchange rate regime primarily because 
the objective is to view the propagation or buffering properties of exchange rates regardless 
of the exchange rate regime in effect. In addition, recent work on exchange rate regime 
classification indicates that many countries apply exchange rate polices that are quite 
different from their stated policies.
7 
 
The empirical analysis begins with the 2-variable model which includes the real and nominal 
effective exchange rates. Within this framework we focus on the extent to which: (i) nominal 
shocks explain a significant part of the variance of the real exchange rate; and (ii) similarly 
whether real shocks actually explain a large share of the nominal exchange rate variability. 
The results summarised in Figure 1 (top chart) indicate only a limited impact of nominal 
shocks on real exchange rate variability. With the exception of Estonia and Lithuania, 
nominal shocks appear to explain only a small share of real exchange rate variability. The 
large temporary component in the real exchange rate in Estonia and Lithuania is due to the 
existence of currency board as any nominal shock translates into a change in the real 
exchange rate. The same chart reveals a relatively a large contribution of nominal shocks in 
explaining the variance of the nominal effective exchange rates across countries. Hungary 
and the Czech Republic, and to a lesser extent Slovenia, are exceptions: a high degree of 
forecast error variance attributed to real shocks, could imply a passive exchange rate policy 
with realignments tied to real shocks which, if correct, could be construed as evidence of the 
nominal exchange rate acting as an absorber of real shocks to the economy. The impulse 
response analysis shows that with the exception of Hungary, the movements in real exchange 
rates in response to real shocks seem to have been somewhat larger, albeit not always 
                                                 
7 Rogoff, et.al. (2003) document the differences between de jure and de facto exchange rate regimes for a large 
set of countries, and provide a new natural classification based upon statistical evidence.   - 9 - 
 
statistically different from, changes in nominal exchange rates.
8 In the case of Estonia the 
nominal exchange rate remained unchanged following a real shock, consistent with the 
existence of a credible currency board system; for Lithuania the observed change in the 
nominal exchange rate, at least initially, is difficult to interpret but it is probably explained by 
the re-pegging of the currency board from the dollar to the euro in 2002.  
 
Overall, nominal shocks do not generally play a major role in explaining real exchange rate 
variability, while real shocks seem to matter when it comes to explaining the variance of 
nominal exchange rates: specifically, the relative importance of real shocks in explaining the 
variance of real and nominal exchange rates is, respectively, 80 percent and 50 percent across 
countries. The influence of nominal shocks on the nominal exchange rate is not however 
insignificant, explaining about one-half of the variance of the nominal exchange rate. 
 
An expanded model includes relative output, the real effective exchange rate and nominal 
effective exchange rate all defined vis-à-vis the euro area. In this setup three shocks are 
identified through restrictions (see Clarida and Gali, 1994, for example); the details are 
included in the Appendix. A real demand (IS) shock  and nominal (LM) shocks are restricted 
to be temporary in nature, while aggregate supply (AS) shocks are allowed to have 
permanent effects on output. Similarly, only AS and IS shocks can have a permanent impact 
on the real effective exchange rate while nominal (LM) can have a permanent (i.e., long-run) 
impact only on nominal exchange rates. 
                                                 
8 An appendix which includes detailed impulse response analysis can be found at 
http://www.kontolemis.com/pages/5/index.htm.    - 10 - 
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Figure 1 (lower chart) shows the proportion of forecast error variance which is explained by 
nominal (LM) shocks obtained using a forecast error variance decomposition, while Figure 2 
shows similar decomposition for real (IS and AS) shocks. As noted before, real demand (IS) 
shocks still explain most of the variance of the real exchange rates, while a mixture of real 
demand and nominal disturbances drive nominal exchange rate dynamics. In contrast, the 
variability of output is explained almost entirely by aggregate supply shocks. Nevertheless, 
some differences across countries exist. For example, supply shocks, but also nominal 
shocks, are found to be rather important in explaining the unconditional variance of the real 
and nominal exchange rates in Poland. Nominal shocks seem to be also important in 
explaining the variance of the real exchange rate in Estonian and Lithuania. Overall, 
aggregate supply shocks are the main determinant of relative output forecast errors while real 
demand shocks have a large impact on exchange rate developments. 
 
The results from the historical decomposition for the nominal and real effective exchange 
rates, for the period 2000-2002 are shown in Figure 3; note that the effective exchange rate is 
defined relative to euro area only.
9 They confirm that real demand shocks account for 
fluctuations in the real exchange rate during this period. Poland, Slovenia, and to a lesser 
extent Estonia and Latvia are notable exceptions. In the case of Poland nominal shocks seem 
to explain the rapid appreciation of the real exchange rate (against the synthetic euro) in 2000 
while supply shocks account for the subsequent depreciation in 2001. In the case of Slovenia, 
real demand shocks do not explain the trend appreciation of the real exchange rate since 
2001. In Estonia nominal shocks explain developments in mid- and late-2001. These 
historical decompositions further confirm that a combination of real demand and nominal 
shocks seem to be the driving force behind recent nominal exchange rate movements. One 
notable exception is Hungary where although real demand shocks seem to explain sudden 
                                                 
9 Fluctuations in relative output were overwhelmingly caused by their own innovations and are omitted in the 
figure.   - 13 - 
 
changes in the exchange rate, neither nominal nor real disturbances can account adequately 
for the significant appreciation of the currency since the beginning of 2001.
10 
 
Implications for ERM II Membership 
In the communication on exchange rate issues relating to (the then) acceding countries, the 
ECB indicated the exact width of the band inside the ERM II will be determined by mutual 
agreement among all parties in the mechanism.
11 Fluctuation bands narrower than the normal 
one (of ±15 percent ) may be set at the request of the interested country; for example, 
Denmark, currently an ERM II participant—albeit well-advanced in the convergence 
process—has retained a narrow (±2.5 percent ) band for the Danish krone. 
 
The results from the impulse response functions, which trace out the reaction of each of the 
variables in the model to corresponding real and nominal shocks, can be used to assess the 
feasibility of adhering to ERM II. For example, impulse response functions of nominal 
effective exchange rates to different shocks can provide a good approximation of the 
movement in nominal rates in the face of exogenous shocks.
12 
                                                 
10 An appendix which includes detailed impulse response analysis can be found at 
http://www.kontolemis.com/pages/5/index.htm. 
11 See “Policy Position of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank on Exchange Rate Issues 
Relating to the Acceding Countries” December 18, 2003, (www.ecb.int).  
12 Notice that such an assessment is limited since it cannot determine an individual country’s susceptibility to 
shocks, or the responsiveness of exchange rates to multiple shocks.   - 14 - 
 





Re lative Ou tp ut
REER
NEER

























Re lative Ou tp ut
REER
NEER



























Re lative Ou tp ut
REER
NEER
























Re lative Ou tp ut
REER
NEER




















































































Re lative Ou tp ut
REER
NEER


























Re lative Ou tp ut
REER
NEER


























































































Re lative Ou tp ut
REER
NEER


























Re lative Ou tp ut
REER
NEER




















































































Re lative Ou tp ut
REER
NEER




























Re lative Ou tp ut
REER
NEER
























































































0.200  - 15 - 
 
 
Figure 4. Response of Nominal Exchnage Rate to Alternative Shocks 
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Figure 4 shows the impact on the level of the nominal effective exchange rate of a 2-standard 
deviation real and nominal shock. At least under the assumption of one-off shocks, the results 
suggest that all countries should be able to cope easily with the wider bands of ERM II. In 
contrast, introducing narrow exchange rate bands appears to be inappropriate in most cases 
with the exception of Cyprus, Estonia and Slovenia. Hungary, and the Slovak and Czech 
Republics appear most likely to experience wider exchange rate swings in the face of real 
demand and nominal shocks.
13  
 
Another Look at Identifying Nominal Shocks: Interest Rates and Credit 
Theoretically, nominal shocks may arise from a number of sources, including monetary 
policy changes, other financial shocks, as well as adjustments in fiscal policy. Identification 
of nominal shocks in the earlier section was accomplished by using information from real 
and nominal exchange rates, and relative output, and making a number assumptions about the 
long-run impact of these type of shocks on output and the real exchange rate. Given the 
importance of nominal shocks in the determination of nominal exchange rates, for example, 
it is important to take another look at the identification of nominal money shocks. Other 
variables, for example, relative interest rates, or private sector credit, may provide more 
insight into the role of nominal shocks.  
 
Indeed, with the exception of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, credit to the private sector 
soared in  most countries, relative to the euro area, and these credit trends are more likely to 
continue, albeit in a more sustainable fashion, in the medium to long run.
14 In theory if credit 
                                                 
13 The results for the Baltics, particularly for Latvia and Lithuania are difficult to interpret given the problem of 
identifying accurately shocks in view of the re-pegging of the litas to the euro, for the case of Lithuania, and the 
link to the SDR for Latvia. In the case of Lithuania it is even more complicated given that the country was 
pegged to the German DM, while the euro effective exchange rate used in this study takes into account of 
exchange rate fluctuations vis-à-vis all other euro-area countries, and hence of bilateral exchange rate changes 
between Germany and the other countries. 
14 The negative growth of credit in the Czech and Slovak Republics reflects, in part, efforts to clean up bad 
loans in the banking system.   - 17 - 
 
developments were driven primarily by monetary policy actions, interest rate differentials 
could provide sufficient information for assessing the extent to which monetary shocks 
influence output and exchange rate developments. Nonetheless, credit shocks are frequently 
uncorrelated with monetary policy shocks and therefore deserve a more thorough 
examination.  
 
Hence, we proceed by adding in our specifications relative interest rates and credit in an 
attempt to isolate the sources of nominal shocks. The relative interest rate is defined as the 
difference between each individual country’s average money market rate and the average 
money market rate from the euro area, while relative private credit is based on IFS data on 
private sector claims for the nine countries in the sample, and loans to the private sector for 
the euro area (as compiled by the ECB).  
 
Figure 5 summarizes the main results obtained using the model which includes the 
relative interest rate variable. For the most part these results appear to be in line with 
those obtained with the 3-variable model.
15 The chart shows that the contribution of 
interest rate shocks seems to be rather small—with the exception of Lithuania, where 
interest rate shocks explain a significant part of the forecast error variance of the real 
and nominal effective exchange rates and which is difficult to explain given the 
currency board regime in that country.
16,17  
                                                 
15 However, the inclusion of the relative interest rate significantly moderates the role of supply shocks in 
exchange rate determination for the case of Poland, which was the main outlier in the previous analysis. 
16 Interestingly, the results from the impulse response analysis (presented in the Appendix) show that shocks to 
the relative interest rate appear, with the exception of Slovenia, to have no significant impact on the nominal 
exchange rate in any country. 
17 The addition of the interest rate variable raises significantly the contribution of nominal (LM) shocks in 
explaining nominal and real exchange rate fluctuations in the case of Hungary. This is interesting since it 
suggests that although interest rates do not appear to be explaining exchange rate fluctuations, other nominal 
shocks are very important. Indeed, interest rate changes over the last few years have not had a meaningful 
impact on the exchange rate, although the authorities have been maintaining a quasi-fixed exchange rate vis-à-
vis the euro. In contrast, wages in the public, but also in the private, sectors have soared since 2000, and have 
led to a major deterioration in the external competitiveness during a period of record (relative to the past-
decade) low interest rates.   - 18 - 
 
 














































Credit Shocks  - 19 - 
 
Figure 5 presents the results (lower chart)  based on the model which includes relative credit. 
Credit shocks seem to be important in explaining the variance of exchange rates (e.g., in 
Poland, Latvia, Slovakia and the Czech Republic), and in some cases the variance of output 
(e.g., Cyprus, Poland, and Estonia).  Interestingly, the addition of relative credit lowers the 
contribution of real demand and nominal shocks in explaining nominal exchange rate 
variability in Estonia, thus implying full pass through of nominal shocks alone, which is 
consistent with the currency board arrangement.  
 
In Poland credit shocks seem to play an important role in determining real and nominal 
exchange rate movements. The case of Poland is interesting, since previous results from 
historical decomposition indicated that nominal shocks explain the rapid appreciation of the 
real exchange rate in 2000. After growing rapidly for several years credit growth slowed 
down steadily through 2002, at the same time as foreign-currency borrowing soared. During 
the period 1999-2001, for example, the share of foreign currency lending to households out 
of total bank lending tripled, and doubled as a share of GDP, to some 2½ percent.
18 Capital 
account liberalisation, together with measures taken by the Central Bank to control credit 
expansion, were the principal factors behind these trends which, in turn, led to a significant 
appreciation of the exchange rate as individuals and firms borrowed abroad  and purchased 
zloties to finance their activities in Poland. 
 
Figure 6 shows the contribution of credit shocks to changes in the nominal effective 
exchange rate during 1999-2002 obtained through the historical shock decomposing of the 
model. It confirms that credit developments were a major factor behind exchange rate 
developments in Poland. For the case of Slovenia and the Czech Republic credit played a 
limited role, although IS shocks appear to drive changes in the nominal effective exchange 
rate. In fact results from the impulse response analysis (Figure 7) show that positive relative 
                                                 
18 See IMF (2002) and OECD (2002) for a discussion.   - 20 - 
 
                                            Figure 6: Contributions of Credit Shocks 
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credit shocks lead to a depreciation of the nominal effective exchange rate in the range of ½ 
to 1¾ percent; specifically, about a 1.8 percent depreciation for the case of Poland. 
 
III.   CONCLUSIONS 
The empirical analysis shows that real demand shocks explain most of the variance of real 
exchange rate fluctuations. Fluctuations in nominal exchange rates appear to be primarily 
driven by real demand shocks,  and nominal shocks, but not by real aggregate supply shocks. 
In contrast, movements in relative output appear to be predominately determined by 
aggregate supply shocks while there is little evidence that exchange rate shocks, either 
nominal or real, cause fluctuations in relative output. Hence, while real and nominal shocks 
seem to have an influence on exchange rate, exchange rate fluctuations, per se, do not appear 
to hinder growth in any significant way.  
The dominance of real shocks is noteworthy and, to the extent that it is symptomatic of 
“more to come” as real convergence advances, it could have implications for countries’ 
decision to enter ERM II and adopt the euro soon after. In the face of real shocks exchange 
rates act as shock absorbers, and hence help smooth output fluctuations. Interestingly, real 
demand shocks seem to explain a relatively small part of the variance of exchange rates in 
the case of two early ERM II participants, namely Estonia and Lithuania. Among the other 
countries Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovenia seem to be influenced significantly by 
real demand shocks. An early move to join ERM II could, ceteris paribus, be more 
problematic for these countries in the short to medium term. However, the relative 
importance of real demand shocks—which may be associated with the liberalization of these 
economies and opening up to trade, and which are likely to dissipate in the future—implys 
that gradually less exchange rate flexibility may be needed. In contrast, real supply shock—
linked to productivity and labour supply changes which are expected to dominate in the 
medium term—do not influence significantly exchange rate dynamics. The size of the 
observed shocks also reveals that the majority of countries, except Cyprus, Estonia, and 
Slovenia, can only cope with participation in a more flexible ERM II arrangement, with wide 
fluctuation bands vis-à-vis the euro.   - 23 - 
 
 
Based on this evidence the case in favour of more exchange rate flexibility is not 
unambiguous. In particular, the importance of nominal shocks in a number of countries is a 
reminder that exchange rate flexibility can be destabilising. In addition, the lack of output 
response to exchange rate movements in the majority of countries may be consistent with the 
"pricing-to-market" hypothesis which , if true, strengthens further the case in favour of ERM-
II membership. 
In order to examine more thoroughly the precise source of nominal shocks we took the 
analysis one step further by examining whether these originated from interest rate changes, or 
credit developments. To the extent that nominal exchange rate fluctuations are explained by 
changes in interest rates one should expect such source of divergences to gradually dissipate 
once countries join the ERM II. However, credit shocks—which can be uncorrelated with 
monetary policy shocks and are linked to the process of real convergence, and consumption 
smoothing by the private sector—can be more problematic.  
We find that changes in interest rates do not propagate nominal or real exchange rate 
movements. Nonetheless, credit shocks explain a significant share of the variance of the 
nominal exchange rate most notably in Poland, and less so in other countries. Positive credit 
shocks tend to lead to a depreciation of the exchange rate: a 1-standard deviation positive 
shock to credit results in a depreciation of the nominal effective exchange rate in the range of 
-½–1¾ percent. The finding for Poland merits attention given that it probably reflects events 
from 1999-2001, when measures taken to control credit led to a stall in credit expansion and 
to a dramatic increase in foreign borrowing, which was in turn accompanied by an 
appreciation of the exchange rate.  
 
These suggest measures introduced to curb credit growth might affect the exchange rate, and 
should therefore be undertaken with caution; interestingly, credit shocks were found to have 
very little impact on exchange rate dynamics in those countries which have experienced rapid 
credit expansion over the past decade. Thus, credit developments, which are likely to 
continue influencing financial sector trends in these countries, do not have strong influence   - 24 - 
 
on exchange rate dynamics unless they lead to dramatic policy measures that typically 
compel market participants to circumvent controls, and resort to alternative borrowing 
practises. 
 
Our attempt to pin down the source of nominal shocks, either stemming from monetary 
policy or credit market developments, was partly successful. To some extent, the results 
indirectly highlight the significance of fiscal policy and its role in propagating nominal 
shocks. In this regard participation in ERM II and subsequently euro adoption, which will 
limit the incidence of fiscal and hence the importance of nominal shocks, may prove less 
problematic.  
The importance of nominal shocks is a reminder of the risks facing these countries in the run-
up to euro adoption. Joining ERM II sooner could limit minimize significantly policy 
induced shocks (e.g., monetary or fiscal policy) and could further, through expectation 
effects, limit speculative and contagion effects. The analysis does not reveal a significant 
impact from (relative) interest rates, but finds some evidence that credit developments are 
important in the determination of exchange rates. Although interest rates may converge fast, 
developments in credit markets may continue to diverge for the foreseeable future. The 
policy implication of the latter is two-fold. First, policy makers should avoid resorting to 
controls in the banking system that could adversely affect exchange rate volatility. Secondly, 
to the extent that fiscal policy contributes to higher domestic demand, a tighter fiscal stance 
would affect the overall demand for credit and thereby limit the impact on exchange rate 





APPENDIX A: Structural VAR methodology 
 
Structural VARs are simultaneous equation systems that allow the dynamic impact of 
exogenous shocks on endogenous variables to be identified through the imposition of 
restrictions. There are a number of SVAR models that can be used to identify innovations. 
Here we use the Blanchard-Quah (BQ) structural VAR methodology which bases the 
identification restrictions on the long-run effect of the exogenous shocks on the endogenous 
variables. Given the consensus on these long-run restrictions, the BQ SVAR methodology 
can fit a number of theoretical models. Also, given the lack of consensus in the literature on 
the behavior of short-run dynamics in SVAR models, these dynamics are left completely 
unconstrained. 
 
Consider the moving average representation of a vector of variables t x , and structural shocks 
t ε : 
i t
i
i t t t A A A x −
∞
=
− ∑ = + + = ∆ ε ε ε
0
1 1 0 . . .       ( 1 )  
where the  i A  matrices represent the impulse response functions of the shocks to the elements 
of  x,  while the ε  vector contains real and nominal shocks. To identify the shocks the 
restriction on the matrix of long-run moving average coefficients, is imposed such that 







i a          ( 2 ) .  
 
Under these conditions the structural VAR model can be estimated in its reduced form 
version by ordinary least squares. In typical VAR format, this means that each element of  t x    - 26 - 
 
is regressed on lagged values of all the elements of x, with the estimated coefficients 
represented by B . That is: 
 
t n t n t t t e x B x B x B x + + + + = − − − ... 2 2 1 1     (3) 
 
where  t e  represents residuals from the estimation of the reduced form VAR. Next, the 
following algebraic manipulation is used to find the matrix of long-run moving average 
coefficients: 
 
t t t e L B L B I e L B I x ) ... ) ( ) ( ( )) ( (
2 1 + + + + = − =
−    (4) 
... 3 3 2 2 1 1 + + + + = − − − t t t t t e D e D e D e x      (5) 
 
Notice that the identification allows us to obtain the structural shocks since  t t C e ε = . This 
methodology is appealing since it enables us to pin down the long-run, or steady-state, 
solution of the model—based on economic theory—while imposing no structure over the 
short-run dynamics of variable. 
 
Identification of Shocks to Exchange Rates 
Standard open economy models recognize two distinct types of shocks, with different 
impacts on real and nominal exchange rates. Real shocks, which can come from supply or 
demand sources, can affect both real and nominal exchange rates. Nominal shocks, perhaps 
emanating from fiscal or monetary sources, for example, can only affect real variables in the 
short-run but should not have an impact on real variables in the long-run. In this regard, 
permanent innovations in supply and demand will result in permanent changes in real and 
nominal exchange rates. Thus, a permanent change in say, the money supply, can have a 
permanent effect on the nominal exchange rate, but only a temporary effect on the real rate. 
   - 27 - 
 
Following Kutan and Dibooglu (1998) let  t x  contain the logged change in real and nominal 










































      ( 6 )  
where 
 
∑ = ) ( t Var ε         ( 7 )  
 
The fundamental shocks  qt ε  and  st ε  are assumed to be orthogonal and therefore, the 
variance-covariance matrix ∑  is diagonal. The BQ framework contains the restriction that 
real shocks have permanent effects on the level of output while nominal shocks have only 
temporary effects—implying that the cumulative effect of nominal shocks on the change in 
output must be zero. Both shocks have permanent effects on the level of nominal rates. 
 
Given the two variable real and nominal effective exchange rates (also denoted by REER, 
and NEER, respectively) case under consideration, four restrictions are required to define the 
four elements of C . Two of these restrictions are simple normalizations, which define the 
variance of the shocks  qt ε  and  st ε . A third restriction comes from assuming that the real and 
nominal shocks are orthogonal. The final restriction regarding the temporary nature of 
nominal shocks, uniquely defines the C  matrix and implies equation (4) in the structural 

































i i     ( 8 )  
 
Intuitively these shocks are, respectively, innovations to the real and nominal exchange rate 
that are not explained by the dynamics of relative prices and the nominal exchange rate. The   - 28 - 
 
identification scheme also allows us to assume that nominal shocks do not have a long-
lasting impact on the real effective exchange rate. 
 
An alternative specification—based on the work by Clarida and Gali (1994)—allows the 
identification of real shocks to be broken up into aggregate supply and demand components, 
in addition to the nominal shock. The increased complexity of this model also moves the BQ 
SVAR model closer to more traditional structural exchange rate models, e.g. Obstfeld (1985) 
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where the relative vis-à-vis the euro area output variable yt is added in the model, and in the 
place of relative price level used by Clarida and Gali (1994), we use the nominal effective 
exchange rate st; the two models should be equivalent, but including the nominal exchange 
rate allows us to infer directly the impact of the shocks on this variable. The three shocks are 
again identified through restrictions on the long-run impact matrix. For example, the real 
exchange rate (IS) and nominal exchange rate (LM) shocks to relative output are restricted to 
be temporary in nature, while only the aggregate supply (AS) shocks are allowed to have 
permanent effects. Regarding real effective exchange rates, only AS and IS shocks are 
allowed to have a permanent impact. Shocks to nominal rates are left completely 
unrestricted, i.e., all disturbances can have a permanent (i.e., long-run) impact on nominal 
exchange rates. Given the ordering of relative output, and real and nominal effective 
exchange rates in the SVAR, a restriction on a long-run multiplier effectively imposes a 
restriction on the elements of the factor matrix. Thus the (1,2), (1,3), and (2,3) elements of C  
matrix are set to zero. The lower triangular structure of the factor matrix implies that the 
structural shocks can be interpreted as underlying supply, demand and nominal shocks, 
respectively.   - 29 - 
 
 
Like Clarida and Gali, impulse response dynamics in response to the three structural shocks 
are examined in order to assess the extent to which identified shocks generate dynamics that 
are in line with the Mundell-Fleming-Dornbusch model.
19 For example, a relative aggregate 
supply shock that boosts domestic output relative to foreign output should result in a fall in 
domestic prices and depreciation in the real exchange rate. While the movement in the 
nominal exchange rate is uncertain, given the high correlation between nominal and real 
exchange rates, it is expected that the nominal exchange rate would help to facilitate the real 
exchange rate response, i.e., the nominal rate would depreciate in response to an aggregate 
supply shock. 
 
A positive nominal shock which increases domestic money supply or reduces money demand 
should result in a decrease in domestic relative to foreign interest rates and depreciation in 
the nominal exchange rate.
20 Of course, the simulative monetary outcome should result in an 
increase in domestic prices, and a rise in domestic output and a real depreciation if prices are 
sticky. Finally, a positive demand shock should in the short-run, result in a nominal, and due 
to sticky prices, real appreciation of the exchange rate as relative output increases. However, 
as prices increase in the long-run, relative output should return to its old level. If the shock is 
permanent, the appreciation in the real rate is permanent as well. 
 
Introducing relative interest rates and private sector credit 
 
Consider the 3-variable model including the interest rate differential (R): 
 
                                                 
19 In the two variable model, the strong positive correlation among nominal and real effective exchange rates, 
would indicate the impulse response functions would behave similarly, except of course, for the long-run 
restriction on nominal shocks to real rates. 
20 Astley and Garratt (1998) note, however, that only real demand shocks have unambiguous effects on nominal 
exchange rates. The effects of nominal and real shocks are more indeterminate since they have opposite effects 
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34 33 32 31
24 23 22 21
14 13 12 11
0
    (10) 
 
where it is assumed that the nominal exchange has no long-run impact on relative output, the 
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a specification which instead implies no long-run impact on the nominal effective 
exchange rate from changes in the relative interest rate.
21 
 
It could be argued that in a flexible exchange rate environment, interest rate shocks 
should have an impact on the exchange rate, particularly in smaller open economies, and 
hence the first formulation (equation 10) would correspond to these groups of countries 
with flexible exchange rates during a considerable part of the period. On the other hand, 
in countries with fixed exchange rates the second formulation (equation 11) might be 
more relevant, since relative interest rates respond to shocks in the nominal effective 
exchange rate.  
 
To examine the extent to which credit shocks have influenced exchange rate 
developments we substitute the interest rate differential with relative credit vis-à-vis the 
                                                 
21 The addition of relative interest rates also means there are now two real and two nominal shocks identified in 
the model.   - 31 - 
 
euro area. The credit variable is ranked third in the VAR, before the exchange rate, 
allowing it have a long-run effect on the nominal effective exchange rate. 
 
 
APPENDIX B: PRELIMINARY DATA ANALYSIS 
Monthly observations on the nominal effective exchange rate and the CPI index for each 
transition country on a trade-weighted basis relative 
to their euro area partners have been taken from the 
International Monetary Fund’s INS database. The 
real exchange rate for each country is defined as the 
nominal exchange rate divided by the relative price 
index, all relative to the euro area. A relative output 
series, defined as the level of industrial production 
in each accession country minus a trade-weighted average of industrial production in the euro 
area, was also constructed from IFS database. Table A1 reports the exact dates of the sample 
periods used in the 2- and 3-variable models. 
 
Preliminary data analysis, not presented in detail here but available from the authors upon 
request, was undertaken on all four variables. Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Philips-Perron 
tests on the logged data have indicated that stationarity can be rejected for the relative output 
series  t y , nominal  t s and real exchange rate  t q series and relative price series  t p , however, 
these tests confirm stationarity of the series in first differenced form. In addition, the 
Johansen maximum likelihood test for cointegration indicated that the null hypothesis of 
cointegrating relationships among the two exchange rate series and for the variables in the 3-
variable model can be rejected at the 5 or 10 percent level. Thus, the three variables 
considered are all found to be difference stationary and there is no evidence of cointegration 
among them. Therefore, we include the logged first differences of real and nominal effective 
exchange rates in the 2-variable SVAR model, and add the relative output in the 3-variable 
model. Finally, the results of Granger causality tests on exchange rates, relative output and 
Table A1. Monthly Data Sample Periods
Start End
Cyprus 1988:1 2003:1







Slovenia 1992:1 2003:2  - 32 - 
 
Table A2  Exchange Rate Regimes of New E.U. Members
Cyprus Peg to euro, +/- 15% bands
Czech Republic Free float
Estonia Currency board to euro (since 1992)
Hungary Peg to euro, +/- 15% bands
Lativa Peg to SDR, with 30% euro weight




1/ Repegged from U.S. dollar to euro in February 2002.
price series indicated that no clear causal relationships that would require a formal reduced 
form approach to estimating these 
relationships. This leads one to 
believe that the structural 
decomposition approach applied here 
is the correct way to proceed. The 
assumption of nonstationary real 
exchange rates in transition countries 
seems reasonable due to evidence of strong real wage and productivity catch up over time 
(Balassa-Samuelson effects). Thus it is expected that equilibrium real exchange rates should 
have a permanent stochastic component during the transition process.
22  
  
Finally, it is important to point out that a variety of exchange rate regimes were in place in 
the individual countries over the sample set. As the accompanying Table A2 indicates, only 
two countries currently have fully floating exchange rate regimes, while two others have 
some degree of a managed floating system. The remaining five countries have various types 
of hard pegged regimes, with two—Lithuania and Estonia—actually having the ultimate hard 
peg in the form of currency boards. In the case of Lithuania the litas, which was linked to the 
dollar through the currency board arrangement since 1994, was re-pegged to the euro as of 
February 2002; which creates a non-trivial problem of interpreting the results given that all 
other variables are defined vis-à-vis the euro area, e.g., the effective exchange rates and 
relative output. Similarly, results for Latvia, which maintains a peg vis-à-vis the SDR, should 
also be interpreted with some caution given the definition of the other variances relative to 
the euro area.
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